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1The topos of time ranges among the most puzzling and intriguing topics in
our philosophical tradition  a seemingly endless source of deep and unsolved
questions: What is time? What is temporal becoming? And how are we to spell
out all this without using temporal notions in the ﬁrst place? These questions are
puzzling also in the sense that in our everyday life we seem to be quite familiar
with the phenomenon of time. In a famous quote from the Confessions, Saint
Augustine points out this discrepancy in the following way: What, then, is time?
If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks me,
I do not know (Augustine 1955, XI.14). Nevertheless, 20th century physics has
seen much progress not in ﬁnally answering these questions, but in providing us
with some new perspectives and perhaps also some deeper insights into the nature
of time from a scientiﬁc point of view. This article is accordingly devoted to give
1An earlier version of the paper was based on the opening lecture Time and temporality
in philosophy of science  an overview to the International Conference The direction of time.
The role of reversibility/irreversibility in the study of nature at the Center for Interdisciplinary
Research (ZiF), Bielefeld, January 14-19, 2002. As such, the paper really doesn't present any
original point of its own, but tries to give a compressed overview on the most prominent
problems and philosophical debates in connection with the issue of time in modern physics.
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an overview on the several aspects of the notion of time  and in particular the
directedness of time  in modern physics.
1 Philosophical preliminaries
1.1 Time and temporality  being and becoming
The notion of time has many faces. One of the most important distinctions in
debates about time is the distinction between time in the sense of being on the one
hand and temporal becoming  tensed timeon the other. In this connection we
ﬁnd in Carnap's autobiographical notes the following well-known passage about
his discussions with Einstein:
Once Einstein said that the problem of the Now worried him seriously.
He explained that the experience of the Now means something special
for man, something essentially diﬀerent from the past and the future,
but that this important diﬀerence does not and cannot occur within
physics. That this experience cannot be grasped by science seemed to
him a matter of painful but inevitable resignation. I remarked that
all that occurs objectively can be described in science; on the one
hand the temporal sequence of events is described in physics; and,
on the other hand, the peculiarities of man's experiences with respect
to time, including his diﬀerent attitude towards past, present, and
future, can be described and (in principle) explained in psychology.
But Einstein thought that these scientiﬁc descriptions cannot possibly
satisfy our human needs; that there is something essential about the
Now which is just outside the realm of science. We both agreed that
this was not a question of a defect for which science could be blamed,
as Bergson thought. I did not wish to press the point, because I
wanted primarily to understand his personal attitude to the problem
rather than to clarify the theoretical situation. But I deﬁnitely had
the impression that Einstein's thinking on this point involved a lack of
distinction between experience and knowledge. Since science in prin-
ciple can say all that can be said, there is no unanswerable question
left. But though there is no theoretical question left, there is still the
common human emotional experience, which is sometimes disturbing
for special psychological reasons. (Carnap 1963, pp. 3738).
Quite obviously Carnap does not fully understand what Einstein really wor-
ries about. Carnap presupposes an understanding of time which coincides with
the common usage of an earlier-later relation  mathematically described by a
real-valued one-dimensional parameter. Following McTaggart (1908) this one-
parameter time is known as B-series. It reﬂects, or at least comes very close to,
the way time is treated in physical theories, especially spacetime theories: time
as being, positions in time as earlier-later relations.
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By way of contrast, there is the strong, subjective, human experience of time
in terms of the temporal modes, the tenses of time: whereas the future is open
and potential, the past is actual and ﬁxed. Possible events of the future come
into being at the present, the Now, and immediately slip into the irreversible
past. This represents, in McTaggart's terms, the A-series of time. Scientiﬁc
reductionism, in its usual stance, comprises the idea of reducing the A-series to
the B-series. And this was precisely what worried Einstein, since he found that
the Now has no place in physics, which indeed is troublesome, if the modes of
time are objective parts of the reality rather than mere subjective experiences.
1.2 The metaphysics of time
McTaggart's main concern was to present an argument which  purportedly 
proves the unreality of time. For the sake of his argument, which we shall not
pursue here, he pointed out that there is an element of permanence in the B-series,
namely that once an event is earlier than another event, it is earlier at all times.
In contrast to this the A-series is manifestly dynamical due to the ever-shifting
of events from future to present and past. One may call this aspect of temporal
becoming the Heraclitean view as opposed to a Parmenidean view. According
to Heraclite everything ﬂows, nothing abides, and the present is primary. Par-
menides, instead, banishes temporal changes as being illusory. Only the static
Is exists.
The Heraclitean view asserts a diachronous existence (or persistence) of things
in time. Any 3-dimensional spatial object is wholly present at any one time.
Proponents of this view are therefore called 3-dimensionalists or endurantists,
and one may presumably consider it the common view of the man on the street.
In contrast to this the Parmenidean view asserts the eternal existence of tenseless
objects which have temporal parts as well as they have spatial parts. Proponents
of this view are called 4-dimensionalists or perdurantists.
Corresponding to these two diﬀering views about temporal change there are the
views about the existence of objects in time or time itself  the subject matter of
the metaphysics or ontology of time. Here, endurantism corresponds to presen-
tism, the view that only the present exists, whereas perdurantism corresponds to
eternalism, the view that all temporal parts exist. Both ontological views about
time are symmetric, which means that they do not respect the distinction be-
tween past and future. There is, moreover, possibilism as an intermediate view
between presentism and eternalism (cf. Savitt 2007). The possibilist asserts that
the present and the actual past are real and, thus, subscribes to the asymmetry
of time as attested by our experience. Accordingly, possibilism is in agreement
with endurantism, but not with perdurantism.
As we will see in the sections about relativity theory there are obstacles for the
views of presentism and possibilism in special as well as in general relativity
theory. Another distinction related to the ontology of time, but also to the
ontology of space and, hence, space-time, is expressed in the debate between
relationalism and substantivalism. Whereas substantivalists consider space-time
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as an entity per se, relationalists merely think of it as a set of relations of objects.
This will also be addressed in the general relativity section.
1.3 Zeno's paradoxes
Taken at face value, the Parmenidean view seems to be absurdly wrong. Everyday
experience obviously tells us that there simply is true and undeniable change in
the world! Nevertheless, the Parmenidean topic of the illusory nature of change
lies at the roots of western philosophy's tradition. Among the early supporters of
Parmenides and his Eleatic school, Zeno of Elea was perhaps the most inﬂuential
 also given the fact that both Plato and Aristotle took his arguments quite
seriously.2 He presented a host of paradoxes by using a dialectic method, which,
following Aristotle, was his genuine methodological invention and which, apart
from the arguments themselves, certainly impressed both Plato and Aristotle.
The idea of the dialectic method is to argue against a certain view by showing
that it entails unacceptable or even absurd consequences. For the particular
case at hand, Zeno had argued that the denial of the Parmenidean view  the
indivisibility of motion, for instance  leads to absurd consequences  namely that
motion is impossible. Note that this is absurd from a non-Parmenidean point of
view. What Zeno of course wanted to highlight was the cognitive inconsistency
in the non-Parmenidean concept of motion  and, hence, the Parmenidean or
Eleatic view of the illusory nature of change and multiplicity as the only viable
alternative. Reality must be a single indivisible One.
Among the variety of ways Zeno presented his argument, the paradox of the race
between Achilles and the tortoise is certainly the most famous one. The idea
is the following: a tortoise (T) has been given a lead for her race with Achilles
(A), the fastest of all the Greeks. Once A has got to the place from which T has
started, T has already advanced a little farther. We may iterate this idea and
come to the paradoxical conclusion that however fast A runs, he can never catch
up with T! (And hence Zeno's conclusion: since this is not what we observe, our
concept of motion is inconsistent and wrong.)
Another paradox, which has basically the same structure, is even simpler to grasp:
Consider a runner who needs to run a ﬁnite race distance (which for simplicity's
sake we shall normalize to 1). He ﬁrst has to run the ﬁrst half x1 = 12 , next the
ﬁrst half of the remaining second half to reach x2 = 34 . Then he has to got to
x3 =
7
8
and so on. Again, the upshot is that the runner can never reach the end
of the race track.
It is now often said that Zeno's paradoxes can easily be resolved within the
modern, Cantorian view of transﬁnites in mathematics. We simply note that the
inﬁnite sum
∑∞
n=1
1
2n
= 1 indeed converges. This is also the predominant view
among philosophers of science (cf. Grünbaum 1967, Salmon 1970 and Huggett
1999), but with the important addendum that there is of course no a priori
guarantee to assume that space-time has the structure of a continuum. This
2However, almost everything we know about Zeno and much of what we know about Par-
menides is due to Plato's and Aristotle's writings.
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has to be conﬁrmed empirically, since Zeno's problem is after all physical, not
mathematical in nature.
Most certainly, however, a `modern Aristotle' would not be very much impressed
by the Cantorian resolution of the paradoxes. Aristotle's very point was to in-
troduce and to insist on the distinction between actual and potential inﬁnities 
and he was fond of the latter (cf. Aristotle's Physics Γ, ∆, Z in Ross 1936). For
him, spatial distance must be considered a whole, being only potentially divisi-
ble. A runner covering a certain race distance does therefore not actually divide
this continuous whole (synholon) into pieces. Conversely, any actual division
of space unavoidably takes time: Achilles indeed doesn't catch the tortoise, if he
performs a halt after each step of iteration! But only this amounts to dividing
space into pieces (or, in more operational terms, to measure a certain spatial
distance). It seems much likely that Aristotle would rather be gratiﬁed to hear
about intuitionistic mathematics as a much more appropriate tool to describe
nature.
Two further remarks concerning the connection between Zeno's paradoxes and
quantum mechanics should be made. The ﬁrst remark is that there is an inter-
esting analogy between Aristotle's view of the continuum and the way we describe
position and motion in quantum mechanics. Suppose we have a moving particle
with constant velocity, hence, deﬁnite momentum, then due to the uncertainty
relations position is indeﬁnite! Conversely, if the particle has a deﬁnite position,
its state of motion, the momentum, is totally uncertain. This ﬁts indeed quite
nicely with Aristotle's views.
The second remark concerns the quantum Zeno eﬀect (cf. Misra/Sudarshan 1977).
This is not really a quantum version of any of Zeno's paradoxes, but rather a for-
mal result with broad similarities to the original. The general idea is that in
quantum theory a system freezes up under continuous observations or measure-
ments. Consider a decaying quantum system. The probability for the system's
state |ψ〉 not to be decayed after t is given by p(t) = |〈ψ|e−itH |ψ〉|2 ≈ 1−(∆H)2t2
with (∆H)2 = 〈ψ|H2|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|H|ψ〉2. Hence, the decay probability 1 − p(t) is
proportional to t2. Thus, after a time to the probability of decay is p(to) ∼ t2o.
But now we make an observation at to
2
, where we get p( to
2
) ∼ ( to
2
)2. After the
observation we must reset our clock and consider the same decay rate for the
second sub-period. So, eﬀectively we get the sum p(to) ∼
(
to
2
)2
+
(
to
2
)2
= t
2
o
2
.
Accordingly for n observations we have p(to) ∼ t2on , which, in the limit n → ∞
of inﬁnitely many observations leads to probability zero. Thus, for a continuous
measurement the system doesn't change at all!
A ﬁrst attempt of an experimental realization of this paradoxical prediction was
made by Itano et al. (1990). The authors used trapped ions and observed certain
state transitions in dependency on disturbing radiation pulses, which they con-
sidered as `measurements.' And, indeed, the results were of the Zeno fashion in
the sense that the transition rate was decreasing with increasing radiation pulse
number. Surely, this particular experimental set-up raises questions about what
counts as a measurement and also, more generally, whether the idea of a contin-
uous measurement has an operational meaning (after all, any real detector has a
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ﬁnite responding time). The lurking discussion of the measurement process shall
be postponed to Section 5.1.
2 Physical preliminaries
Our considerations have already reached a technical level, but some preliminary
remarks concerning the notions of time, time reversal and the arrows of time
should be made before addressing the particular problems in physical theories.
2.1 Newtonian space-time and time reversal (reversal of
motion)
Newtonian space-time is generally considered the epitome of a ﬁxed background
space-time reﬂecting the spatio-temporal symmetries of classical mechanics. Due
to its mathematical structure R3 × T, Newtonian space-time allows for a unique
3-space foliation and, hence, a global cosmic time. Its 3-dimensional spatial
slices can be understood as planes of absolute simultaneity, meaning that the
notion and measurement of time in Newtonian space-time is independent of any
reference frame. In his famous scholium Newton described time as an absolute
entity: Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature,
ﬂows equably without relation to anything external (Newton 1962, p. 6).
As well-known, Newtonian physics shows invariance under Tˆ : t→ −t with
q(t)→ q(−t) and q˙(t)→ −q˙(−t), (1)
such that the Hamiltonian transforms as H(q, p) → H(q,−p). The operation Tˆ
is usually called time reversal. However, this should be taken with a grain of
salt, since what Tˆ really does is rather a reversal of motion, as should be clear
from (1). Hence, physicists deﬁne temporal reversibility as reversal of motion 
a reversal in the sense of the B-series.
The idea of Tˆ is to expresses the isotropy of time. But of course, since Tˆ is a
discrete symmetry, Noether's theorem does not apply and there is no conserved
quantity connected with Tˆ . Instead of isotropy, the homogeneity of time is ex-
pressed via a conserved quantity  total energy  in terms of the ﬁrst law. In fact,
both laws of thermodynamics can be seen as laws about the nature of time: while
the ﬁrst law expresses the homogeneity, the second law stresses the anisotropy of
time  in contrast to the alleged isotropy of the Tˆ -symmetry. Section 4 takes up
this issue.
2.2 Arrows of time
In his paper on Singularities and time-asymmetry, Penrose (1979) presented
a list of seven possible arrows of time, which might be helpful to structure the
following sections.3
3The expressions in quotes are Penrose's formulations.
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1. Weak interaction arrow: The decay of the K0-meson is a clear experi-
mental result and as such an `almost' direct indication that Nature at least
in one manifest case distinguishes past and future. However, this is only
`almost' an indication since, ﬁrst, this literally weak interaction eﬀect is, as
Penrose puts it, utterly minute (smaller than 10−9) and it seems therefore
highly implausible to try to establish the more apparent arrows of time on
this tiny eﬀect. Second, the K0-decay can only be observed indirectly via
CP -violation and under the assumption that CPT is conserved.
2. Quantum mechanical arrow: Quantum mechanical observations, whether
in terms of `collapses of the wave function' or stated otherwise, are time-
asymmetric phenomena which give rise to quantum indeterminism. The
quantum measurement process is discussed in section 5.1.
3. Thermodynamical arrow: The general entropy increase of isolated systems
on the macro-level according to the second law clashes with Tˆ -symmetry
on the micro-level. Consequences will be laid out in section 4.
4. Electrodynamical arrow: Classical electrodynamics is time-symmetric  there
are future-directed, retarded waves as well as past-directed, advanced waves
possible  , but still we only observe the retardation of radiation, as for
instance the spherical emission of (point) sources into the future time di-
rection. We touch upon this issue in section 5.2.
5. Psychological arrow: There is our indisputable feeling that the past is ﬁxed,
whereas the future is open and mutable, and also that causation acts to-
wards the future only. Penrose calls it the psychological time. Here, in our
subjective time perception, we clearly distinguish between A- and B-time
series.
6. Cosmological arrow: The expansion of the universe favors the future di-
rection. This arrow is often connected to the thermodynamical as well as
the electrodynamical arrow. It will be mentioned in section 4.
7. Gravitational arrow: This arrow is due to the fact that gravitational col-
lapses result in black hole singularities, whereas white holes have not been
observed so far. While Penrose is particularly concerned with it, it plays no
role in this article (readers may refer to Penrose's and similar literature).
3 Relativity theory
3.1 Special relativity
Special relativity (SR) mainly diﬀers from pre-relativistic, classical mechanics by
the assumption of a universal and ﬁnite limiting velocity, empirically identiﬁed
with the vacuum velocity of light c (we already presuppose the relativity principle
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for inertial reference frames, which may be reconciled with classical mechanics ei-
ther). The ﬁnite c equips space-time with a causal lightcone structure and, thus,
replaces Newtonian space-time by Minkowskian space-time, a united combina-
tion of space and time in the sense that, in general, Lorentz transformations mix
temporal and spatial parameters. It must have been this feature of the trans-
formations which led Minkowski in his famous 1908 Cologne lecture on space
and time to the statement: Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are
doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two
will preserve an independent reality (Minkowski 1909, p. 75, translation quoted
from Pais 1982, p. 152).But here we have almost obviously, from the quite contra-
dictory nature of his quote by using henceforth (or, even more obviously von
Stund an  from this hour  in the German original), the entire problem in a
nutshell, whether time in its independency with respect to all its features must
really be given up. Doesn't it seem that Minkowski did at best dispense with the
independency of a B-series time, while still being committed to the A-series?
Nevertheless SR's resulting relativity of simultaneity, that is the frame-dependency
of simultaneity and hence the denial of absolute time, poses problems for enduran-
tism and, correspondingly, presentism or possibilism as views about the reality of
temporal objects and the ontology of time. The relativity of simultaneity means
that the temporal distance between two space-like separated events is not deﬁned.
This is usually illustrated for observers with diﬀerent relative velocities, which are
comparable to c. But we may as well consider low velocities and far remote events
instead, as Roger Penrose shows in a drastic example by considering two persons
who diﬀer in their views about the launching of a space ﬂeet on Andromeda to
invade planet Earth (Penrose 1989, p. 303):
Two people pass each other on the street; and according to one of
the two people, an Andromedean space ﬂeet has already set oﬀ on
its journey, while to the other, the decision as to whether or not the
journey will actually take place has not yet been made.
This is obviously an odd situation, since diﬀerent observers give diﬀerent reports
about the coming-into-existence of one and the same event. And this conﬂicts
with presentism stating that all that exists exists wholly in the present. So, for
presentists, the judgment about what is real seems to become frame-dependent.
Many authors in this debate4 are convinced that the relativity of simultaneity
cannot be reconciled with presentism (or possibilism) and that we have to be
eternalists instead. Parmenides strikes back!
The problem gets even worse, if we consider the further thesis of the conven-
tionality of simultaneity : the view that the simultaneity relation of two inertial
clocks must be chosen by convention (cf. Reichenbach 1928,  19, and Grünbaum
1963). Consider two clocks A and B in an arbitrary inertial frame of reference.
4For the more recent debate compare the contributed papers to the sections Special Rela-
tivity and Ontology and The Prospects for Presentism in Spacetime Theories (and references
therein) in the Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Associ-
ation, Part II, Philosophy of Science 67 (3), Supplement, 2000.
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To synchronize these clocks we may send a light signal at A-clock's time t1 from
A to B, where it is instantaneously reﬂected back to A, arriving at t2. The stan-
dard simultaneity is then the deﬁnition that the event at t′ = t1 + ²(t2− t1) with
² = 1/2 is simultaneous with the signal's reﬂection at B. However, as Einstein
himself has put it in his famous popular book on relativity theory:
That light requires the same time to traverse ... [both paths] is in re-
ality neither a supposition nor a hypothesis about the physical nature
of light, but a stipulation which I can make of my own free will in
order to arrive at a deﬁnition of simultaneity (Einstein 1920,  8).
Thus, the choice ² = 1/2 is a mere convention  and this, then, could be ex-
ploited to the claim that the coming-into-existence of events is not only frame-
but convention-dependent!
However, Malament (1977) has shown that  under some minimal, seemingly
innocuous conditions  standard simultaneity is the only nontrivial equivalence
relation in accordance with causal connectability (this assumption might be con-
sidered a version of the causal theory of time). Nevertheless, commentators have
even attacked these minimal assumptions. Sarkar/Stachel (1999) raised particu-
lar doubts about the fact that in Malament's proof the simultaneity relation has
to be symmetric under temporal reﬂections. Giulini (2001) gives a new twist to
the debate by considering only simultaneity relations which are physical in the
sense that they are invariant under the automorphism group of spacetime. The
conventionality issue is certainly not yet settled (see Janis 2006).
3.2 General relativity
General relativity (GR) poses even severe problems on a Heraclitean view of time
than does SR. Let us start with the most prominent, recent argument concerning
the ontological status of space-time, the question, whether space-time substan-
tivalism, the view that space-time has a substantial or existential status on its
own, is possible at all. The question has its traditional forerunner in the famous
debate between Newton and Leibniz about the status of space. Whereas Newton
held a substantivalist position, Leibniz advocated the opposing relationalist view
according to which space is nothing but the set of possible relations of bodies (cf.
Earman 1989, Ch. 6, and Ch. 9 for the following).
When Einstein around 1912 in his search for a relativistic gravitational theory
came to realize that the ﬁeld equations must be generally covariant, that is in-
variant under all coordinate transformations, he was quite confused about the
physical meaning of this requirement. He invented an argument saying that
generally covariant ﬁeld equations cannot uniquely determine the gravitational
ﬁeld. Part of the argument was to consider an empty region in the energy-matter
distribution, and so it was dubbed the hole argument (Lochbetrachtung in
German).5
5We cannot follow the original argument due to lack of space. Historians of science have
wondered about the trivial nature of Einstein's hole argument (besides the fact that he could
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In 1987, John Earman and John Norton presented a new version of the hole ar-
gument focusing on its ontological implications (Earman/Norton 1987). They
considered diﬀeomorphic models of GR, which are usually understood to rep-
resent the same physical situation (this was Einstein's early confusion). More
precisely, let φ : M → M be a diﬀeomorphic mapping deﬁned on the space-
time manifold M and M = 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉 be a model of GR with metric gµν
and stress-energy tensor Tµν , then M ′ = 〈M, φ∗gµν , φ∗Tµν〉 is also a model of the
theory. The reason for this is that M and M ′ are empirically indistinguishable.
However, under certain ontological premises, in particular under the substanti-
valist assumption of space-time points as entities per se, M and M ′  despite
their empirical indistinguishability  represent diﬀerent states of reality. Since
Einstein's ﬁeld equations cannot uniquely determine the temporal development
of diﬀerent diﬀeomorphic models (owing to general covariance), the space-time
substantivalist has to accept a radical indeterminism arising in his picture of the
world. Earman and Norton chose a `hole diﬀeomorphism' h with h = id for t ≤ to
and h 6= id for t > to (obeying usual smoothness and diﬀerentiability conditions
at to). We then have M = M ′ for t ≤ to, but M 6= M ′ for t > to  an apparent
breakdown of determinism from the substantivalist's point of view.
The new hole argument has caused a host of debates and comments  including
intriguing objections and new options for substantivalists  but the majority of
philosophers of science today is convinced that such an ad hoc indeterminism is
far too high a price to pay for space-time substantivalism. Earman has shed new
light on the debate by focusing on the, as he calls it, ideological  rather than
ontological implications of the hole argument (Earman 2000). These implications
mainly arise from the non-trivial aspect of general covariance in GR. Take, for in-
stance, Kretschmann's famous 1917 objection against Einstein's alleged `principle
of general covariance' in GR. Indeed, general covariance as the mere requirement
of covariance under coordinate transformations is physically vacuous, it should
quite generally be applicable in any sensible physical theory. But in GR the
situation is far more complex: we must carefully distinguish between two appli-
cations of the concept of diﬀeomorphisms, for they might either correspond to
mere coordinate transformations, but also to transformations of reference frames
in the sense of physically instantiated transformations of observers provided with
measuring rods and clocks. GR is thus characterized by the fact that not only
the purely mathematical requirement of general coordinate covariance holds, but
also the principle of general relativity, according to which any possible reference
frames are seen as physically equivalent (for non-inertial frames one has of course
to take compensating gravitational ﬁelds into account).
It is possible, in fact, to reconstrue GR as a gauge theory of the diﬀeomorphism
group. This causes, already on the level of classical GR, the infamous problem of
time: motion is pure gauge, all the genuine observables, which are gauge invariant
quantities, are constants of the motion. Taken at face value this is a dramatic
not make use of modern diﬀerential geometry), but I am inclined to follow position (Stachel
1989) that it wasn't a trivial argument. The reader may also consult Norton (1993) for a
comprehensive overview on the debates about general covariance.
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result! Parmenides indeed strikes back twice as hard, since this not only means
a block universe stript of A-series change (and accordingly the problems with
presentism already in SR), but no B-series change, a truly frozen universe as a
sort of neo-Parmenideanism or McTaggartism, as Earman (2002) puts it.
Physicists usually begin to pay attention to these problems in connection with
the question of how to construct a theory of quantum gravity, since here the prob-
lem of time becomes apparent because of the timeless Wheeler-DeWitt equation.
However this equation is nothing but the quantum variant of the Hamiltonian
constraint and so, strictly speaking, the problem of no B-series change already
exists on the classical level. Indeed, many of the leading ﬁgures in quantum
gravity, relationalists in the majority, are aware of this fact (cf. Rovelli 2000).
We shall not say more about quantum gravity here, but brief mention should be
made about two further aspects of the concept of time as they must presumably
be expected from a truly quantized space-time theory: the possibility of instants
of time (e.g. chronons, Finkelstein 1996), and time as a quantum operator. An-
other source of questions about time connected with GR is cosmology. Since
the cosmological arrow also relates to the thermodynamical arrow, cosmological
aspects will be touched upon in the following section.
4 Thermodynamics
Most of the arguments about time presented so far have been arguments about
the ontology rather than arguments about the directedness of time. In thermo-
dynamics, however, the general entropy increase of isolated systems according to
the second law reﬂects an asymmetry of time: the thermodynamical arrow.6
4.1 The second theorem  a law?
In his kinetic theory of gases, Boltzmann considered a transport equation for the
distribution function f(q, p, t) in phase space and was able to describe entropy as
S = −H(f(q, p, t)) = −
∫
d3qd3p f(q, p, t) log f(q, p, t). (2)
His aim was to arrive at a proper microscopic underpinning of macroscopic ther-
modynamics  and in particular to obtain a microscopic version of the second
law. For this purpose he introduced the famous Stoßzahlansatz, also known as
the assumption of molecular chaos, where the two-particle distribution function
is written as a simple product of one-particle functions, which amounts to the
assumption of uncorrelated particles before collision. This means that the time-
asymmetry is put into a particular assumption about the initial conditions. From
6Compared to the importance of this issue the presentation in the following is far too brief.
Some more elaborate references are: Ben-Menahem/Pitowsky (2001), Guttmann (1999), Sklar
(1993), Uﬃnk (2001) and Uﬃnk (2006). For a physics reference see for instance Huang (1987).
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his ansatz, Boltzmann he was able to derive the infamous H-theorem
dH(f(q, p, t))
dt
≤ 0, (3)
which describes the tendency of a gas to evolve to the Maxwell equilibrium dis-
tribution.
However, the well-known and quite general problem with this account (as ex-
pressed in the early and famous objections of Loschmidt, Poincaré and Zermelo)
is the obvious contradiction between the alleged macroscopic irreversibility and
the apparently existing reversibility on the mirco-level of classical particle me-
chanics. Indeed, how should it be possible at all to infer logically from a perfectly
reversible mirco-mechanics to an irreversible macro-world?
The usual stance is to consider the increase of entropy only statistically and,
thus, granting the H-theorem merely the character of a statistical law. But this
does not solve the problem entirely, since the main worry with Boltzmann type
accounts is to understand where the incredibly low initial entropy state comes
from. Boltzmann himself (cf. Boltzmann 1896) was fully aware of this problem
and tried to circumvent it  in various ways. One of his ideas is known as the
ﬂuctuation hypothesis : our known world is a real ﬂuctuation phenomenon in a
universe of much greater spatial and temporal extension. A this point the con-
nection between the thermodynamical arrow and the cosmological arrow comes
into play.
There is, however, a further complication here which has to do with an underlying
and sometimes overlooked time-symmetry of the whole Boltzmannian approach.
The problem becomes visible in the ﬂuctuation hypothesis. The point is that due
to (3) and starting from an initial, low entropy state at t = to we get increasing
entropy in either time direction! In other words, theH-theorem indeed establishes
increasing entropy for the future direction t > to, but  from the same logic  also
for the past direction t < to. One must therefore come to the conclusion that the
H-theorem does not single out the future direction and is thus not equivalent to
the second law (seen as a law which truly distinguishes between past and future).
This latter problem seems to be the real threat of any microstatistical formulation
of thermodynamics and it is totally unclear how solve this riddle within the realm
of microphysics. It is therefore not implausible to search for entirely diﬀerent,
rather meta-theoretical solutions. Such an account to secure the second law and,
hence, true irreversibility, was proposed by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and is
based on a pure epistemological consideration of Kantian inclination. By using a
transcendental argument, that is by referring to our methodological preconditions
of experience, Weizsäcker claims that the distinction between past and future is
already a fundamental precondition of experience  as can be seen from the
analysis of our usual way of deﬁning experience:
A possible deﬁnition of experience may be that it means to learn from
the past for the future. Any experience I now possess is certainly past
experience; any use I now can still hope to make of my experience is
certainly a future use. In a more reﬁned way one may say that science
12 Physics and Philosophy  2008  Id: 012
Holger Lyre: Time in Philosophy of Physics: The Central Issues
sets up laws which seem to agree with past experience, and which are
tested by predicting future events and by comparing the prediction
with the event when the event is no longer a possible future event but
a present one. In this sense time is a presupposition of experience;
whoever accepts experience understands the meaning of words like
present, past, and future (Weizsäcker 1971, p. 241; engl. version
p. 195).
Thus, the central argument here is that in our empirical sciences we necessarily
presuppose an understanding of the tenses of time, otherwise we were not able to
explain what we mean by empirical. As a presupposition, however, we cannot
expect the distinction between past and future dropping oﬀ from physics as an
empirical result, since this would be circular. We rather have to make explicit
the distinction as a precondition of experience, which then might help to bridge
the decisive gap between the H-theorem and the second law.
4.2 Maxwell's demon, entropy and information
Besides the diﬃculties of a microscopic underpinning of the second law, micro-
scopic attacks on its validity, conversely, also seem to fail. The probably most
famous example of this type is Maxwell's demon. James Clerk Maxwell's idea
was the following:
... the second law of thermodynamics ... is undoubtedly true as
long as we can deal with bodies only in mass, and have no power of
perceiving or handling the separate molecules of which they are made
up. But if we conceive a being whose faculties are so sharpened that he
can follow every molecule in its course, such a being, whose attributes
are still as essentially ﬁnite as our own, would be able to do what is
at present impossible to us. For we have seen that the molecules in
a vessel full of air at uniform temperature are moving with velocities
by no means uniform, though the mean velocity of any great number
of them, arbitrarily selected, is almost exactly uniform. Now let us
suppose that such a vessel is divided into two portions, A and B, by
a division in which there is a small hole, and that a being, who can
see the individual molecules, opens and doses this hole, so as to allow
only the swifter molecules to pass from A to B, and only the slower
ones to pass from B to A. He will thus, without expenditure of work,
raise the temperature of B and lower that of A, in contradiction to the
second law of thermodynamics (Maxwell 1871, reprinted in Leﬀ/Rex
1990, p. 4).
This thought experiment of Maxwell provoked a debate which has not stopped
until today7 and from which only the most important highlights shall be men-
7For a most comprehensive collection of important papers in the more than a century long
debate about Maxwell's demon see Leﬀ/Rex (1990), Leﬀ/Rex (2003) and also Earman/Norton
(1998) and Earman/Norton (1999).
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tioned: The early discussions focused on the aspect of the physical realizability
of the demon and brought to light that pure technical solutions fail and that the
demon must in addition be `intelligent.' This was most clearly worked out by
Szilard (1929) who showed that, quite generally, any measurement produces an
increase of entropy. These considerations, carried on by Brillouin, Gabor and von
Neumann, led to the idea of a thermodynamic equivalent of a bit ∆E = kBT ln 2,
understood as the minimum energy to produce or storage 1 bit of information.
The ﬁnal clue, however, came with the work of Landauer (1961) and Bennett
(1982). Landauer discovered that memory erasure in computers results in an en-
tropy increase in the environment, and Bennett therefore argued that the demon,
who has to storage and to remember the data he obtains about the molecule
velocities, saves the second law by the very act of resetting his memory (which is
unavoidable for any realistic demon with a ﬁnite memory).
Landauer's and Bennett's work points out the deep connection between the con-
cepts of entropy and information, as already suggested in the thermodynamic
equivalent of a bit. Indeed, their information theoretic exorcism of Maxwell's
demon hints at a renewed and fundamental interpretation of entropy in pure in-
formation theoretic terms. From a mathematical point of view, the close analogy
between Boltzmann's formula S = −kB
∑
i pi ln pi (in diﬀerent notation than
(2); pi is the probability of a system to be in a certain microstate and kB the
Boltzmann constant) and the well-known Shannon (1948) information entropy
H = −∑i pi ldpi giving the expectation value of the information content of a
source (where I = −ldp is the information content of a sign with probability p) is
already striking. A certain confusion, however, arose about the sign of both quan-
tities. Entropy may indeed be interpreted as a speciﬁc kind of non-information 
the ignorance of the particular microstate in a given macrostate. Brillouin (1962)
therefore, envisaged a negentropy principle of information. Perhaps here we have
a rather verbal problem which might just be resolved by distinguishing potential
from actual information, as Weizsäcker (2006), p. 215 has proposed. In this ter-
minology, entropy is potential information, the possible amount of information of
a given macrostate, if all the microstates were known.
Conceptual links between entropy and (potential) information have been advo-
cated by important thinkers in the foundations of thermodynamics (cf. Jaynes
1957a, Jaynes 1957b, Rothstein 1971, Weizsäcker 1971 and Weizsäcker 2006).
But of course, the main worry with the information theoretic view is the seem-
ingly subjective nature of the concept of information as opposed to the alleged
objective nature of entropy as a system state quantity  or, in other words, the
rather epistemic nature of information as a property of the observer as opposed
to the ontic nature of entropy as a property of physical systems. This is why, for
instance, Earman and Norton (1999) dismiss the information theoretic exorcism
of Maxwell's demon altogether. On the other hand, it seems that physics in many
of its modern developments uncovers the importance of the notion of information.
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5 Quantum mechanics
5.1 The measurement problem
As Penrose has pointed out (see 2.2), quantum mechanics gives rise to an arrow
of time because of the measurement problem. To begin with, we should review
the measurement problem in brief. We consider a system S and a measuring
apparatus A, and split the measurement process into diﬀerent steps: As a ﬁrst
step, S and A must couple, such that formally one has to enlarge the Hilbert
space of S to the Hilbert space of the compound system S ⊗A, while, secondly,
a measurement interaction Hˆint takes place. Next, the compound system, being
still in a pure state, will be separated into subsystems S and A again. The states
of the subsystems are now formally given by the reduced density operators ρˆS
and ρˆA. At the end of the measuring chain we may read oﬀ the measuring result
 a deﬁnite pointer state of A (if all went well).
The measurement problem arises now from the fact that the operators ρˆS and ρˆA,
which we obtain after the formal separation of S and A, are so-called improper
mixtures, which means that the ignorance interpretation is not applicable. This
amounts to saying that it is not possible to attribute a deﬁnite state to S (or A,
respectively)  neither of the subsystems does allow for an objectiﬁcation (the
assumption of a deﬁnite, that is observer-independent state of ρˆS leads to formal
contradictions; cf. Mittelstaedt 1998). Since we do, however, expect measuring
results to be deﬁnite and objective, the replacement of improper by proper mix-
tures, known as the reduction of the wave function, has to be put in by hand
(Heisenberg cut). According to this minimal instrumentalist interpretation, as
one could have it, the reduction of the wave function, which cannot be described
by some unitary process, must be seen as an indeterministic element over and
above the deterministic quantum dynamics.
It should particularly be emphasized that the failure of the ignorance interpre-
tation really is the hard problem of the measurement process. This remark is
in order in view of the successful and persuasive application of the various de-
coherence approaches on the market, whose importance could undoubtedly be
established within the last decades: In realistic cases, the coupling of S to the
environment will unavoidably destroy the typical quantum correlations (cf. Joos
2003). However, following John Bell's classic phrasing, the vanishing of correla-
tions FAPP (for all practical purposes, Bell 1990), should not be confused with
the vanishing of the non-applicability of the ignorance interpretation. For even if,
in a suitable pointer basis, we are left with, say, probabilities 1
2
each and negligi-
ble superposition probabilities for the two outcomes of a simple binary quantum
alternative (a quantum coin tossing, for instance), the failure of the ignorance
interpretation implies that it is still not the case that the quantum coin does
possess some deﬁnite state with corresponding probabilities as merely expressing
the observer's ignorance about this very state.
This, indeed, causes a severe problem for determinism in quantum mechanics. In
contrast to the classical statistical mechanics case (see Sect. 4), non-objectiﬁable
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quantum probabilities do not allow for a merely statistical indeterminism (and,
hence, a hidden determinism). It has therefore become quite fashionable among
`decoherentists' to subscribe to a many worlds interpretation in order to establish
an `ontologically adequate' approach to the occurrence of quantum probabilities
by asserting one real world for each measuring outcome. Those, who do not wish
to enlarge reality in such a drastic manner, have to accept a radical quantum
indeterminism on the bottom level  since otherwise the question, why appar-
ently only one of the two dynamically independent components of a quantum
alternative is experienced, remains entirely unexplained.
5.2 Interpretations of QM
Quantum theory  unlike other physical theories  is loaded with deep interpre-
tational problems. The above sketched minimal instrumentalist interpretation is
`minimal' in the sense that it suﬃces to use the theory as a highly successful tool
for applied physics. And to be sure, in this sense quantum theory is the most
precise and successful physical theory mankind has ever discovered. To many
and from a more concerned ontological point of view, however, the instrumen-
talism of the working physicist seems to be unsatisfactory. This is why we see
a garden variety of competing interpretations of quantum theory  some who ei-
ther deny the measurement problem or the indeterminism claim or both. In the
following, we shall concentrate on two such interpretations  the Bohmian and
transactional interpretation  which take diﬀerent views on time-(a)symmetry
and (in)determinism in quantum physics, but which are nevertheless empirically
equivalent. We are therefore facing remarkable cases of theory underdetermina-
tion by empirical evidence.
Bohm's original 1952 account of quantum mechanics (Bohm 1952) is indeed ba-
sically a clever re-formulation of ordinary quantum mechanics in the sense that
one extracts a term from the Schrödinger equation which formally looks like a
potential  a non-local quantum potential, however  and which is then used in
a Newton-type equation of motion. This additional equation, which does not ex-
ist in the minimalist formulation, re-introduces an ontological picture of particle
trajectories into Bohmian mechanics. Bohmians consider their view as `realistic'
 without neglecting the genuine quantum non-locality (which makes the particle
trajectories quite `surrealistic'; cf. Englert et al. 1992).
It is an indeed remarkable fact that in Bohmian mechanics the measurement
problem may be said to disappear. Given the quite general analysis in terms of
the non-applicability of the ignorance interpretation in the preceding section, one
might wonder how this is possible at all. So here's a ﬁrst motivation: The non-
applicability of the ignorance interpretation amounts to saying that an observer
cannot distinguish between improper and proper mixture states of S or, in other
words, that he has no means to decide whether the measuring apparatus A is still
correlated to S or not. To decide this he would have to apply a suitable meta-
observable on the compound system S ′ = S ⊗ A, but this can obviously only be
done by a meta-observer with apparatus A′. We may extend this consideration
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to the universe as the largest physical system possible. As inner observers we
cannot distinguish between proper and improper mixtures of subsystems of the
universe, such that it is logically possible to assume the initial conditions of any
particle positions, as Bohmians would have it, as non-local hidden variables with
determinate values ﬁxed by a deterministic velocity equation. Hence, our usual
quantum mechanical probability calculus must be interpreted as arising due to
our subjective ignorance of the objective state of the universe much like the usage
of probabilities in classical statistical mechanics (where we do apply an ignorance
interpretation). This is why Bohmians are indeed able to circumvent the prob-
lem of the ignorance interpretation in the measurement process. We may hence
conclude that per constructionem Bohmian mechanics is purely deterministic and
time-symmetric in analogy to classical mechanics.
Let us now turn to a somewhat lesser well-known approach of quantum mechan-
ics: transactional interpretation (Cramer 1986). It is mainly inspired from the
Wheeler-Feynman approach of electrodynamics (Wheeler/Feynman 1945; it has
only recently attracted new interest from philosophers of physics; cf. Price 1996
Frisch 2000). The main idea is that Wheeler and Feynman allowed for the full
time-symmetric set of solutions of the Maxwell wave equations, in particular the
existence of advanced solutions. Usually, these backwards-in-time radiating waves
are dismissed on the basis of suitable boundary conditions as for instance the
Sommerfeldsche Ausstrahlungsbedingung, according to which the universe must
be seen a sink of radiation. Thus, the electrodynamical arrow is based in one way
or the other either on the cosmological or the thermodynamical arrow.
In the same line of thinking Cramer considers both retarded and advanced wave func-
tions. The Wheeler-Feynman absorber condition  a suitable canceling of re-
tarded and advanced solutions  turns in Cramer's account into a transaction
(hand-shaking) between retarded oﬀer waves from the emitter and advanced
conﬁrmation waves from the absorber. As an exchange between waves from
the past and waves from the future the transaction as such is atemporal. Over
and above that the approach is time-symmetric (despite, Cramer's remarks in his
1986, Sect. III.J). The situation is analogous to the underlying time-symmetry of
Boltzmann's H-theorem (Sect. 4): Cramer's account cannot single out the future
lightcone.
Cramer believes that his interpretation gives better explanations of non-local ef-
fects such as EPR-Bell correlations and delayed choice measurements than the
standard formulation, but simultaneously emphasizes that both lead to the same
experimental predictions. We are thus left with three apparent cases of theory
underdetermination  the minimal interpretation, Bohmian mechanics, and trans-
actional interpretation  which are empirically equivalent but drastically diﬀer in
ontology.8 Thus, on the basis of pure interpretational manoeuvres one may choose
between indeterminism, determinism, and partial atemporalism!
8Some Bohmians do assert possible empirical diﬀerences to the standard approach by intro-
ducing eﬀective wave functions, which are completely decoupled from their environment (cf.
Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi 1992; I would like to thank David Albert and Roderich Tumulka for
indicating this to me.)
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6 Conclusion
We've reached the end of our tour de force through questions about time and its
direction in modern philosophy of physics. It goes without saying that we could
only touch upon a few of a whole universe of aspects of this extensive topic. For
instance, no mention was made of phenomena involving `backwards causation,'
such as time-travel (cf. Earman 1995). Indeed, the whole issue about causa-
tion was omitted, just as counterfactuals have not been addressed (cf. Horwich
1987) Finally, some further literature shall be indicated to the interested reader:
Very good physics references, for instance, are Schulman (1997) and Zeh (1989).
Among the philosophy of physics literature mention should be made of Albert
(2000), Butterﬁeld (1999), Butterﬁeld/Earman (2006), Callender (2002), Callen-
der (2006), Horwich (1987), Savitt (1995), Savitt (2006), Sklar (1974) and Price
(1996). Again, this little list of references is of course far from being complete,
but rather provides useful entries for more elaborate studies of the fascinating
issue of time and its direction in physics and philosophy.
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